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Abstract 
Jamming attacks like constant jamming, deceptive jamming, random jamming and reactive jamming disrupt the 
normal operation of nodes in wireless sensor networks thereby drastically affecting the network throughput, 
delay and energy consumption by sending random signals in the network without following the underlying 
Media Access Control rules. These signals collide with the legitimate signals causing undue traffic in the 
network leading to Denial of Service Attack. This work provides a model for the different jamming attacks 
experienced in wireless sensor networks using Unified Modeling Language. Modeling the different jamming 
attacks would help in better description of their behavior and strategy. Established models can be employed in 
the design of jamming detection and mitigation framework for DoS attacks mitigation in wireless sensor 
networks that involve sensors which are known to have limited and constrained resources. 
Keywords: Jamming attack; Media Access Control; Denial of Service Attack; Sensors. 
1. Introduction 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are prominent and versatile area of research due to their wide range of 
application in critical areas of the society like healthcare, infrastructures and military surveillance systems.  
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 Nodes in this grade of network can be of equal or varied capacity depending on their design architecture. 
Generally, there are three major forms of WSNs thus; cluster based, flat-based and hierarchical wireless sensor 
networks with the major difference being the arrangement of node and how collected data are transferred from 
the sensor node to the base station[1] During deployment, WSN find application in the following distinctive 
areas thus; underground, multi-media, Mobil and terrestrial WSNs [2]. These sensors are usually autonomous in 
operation and are located at remote areas where they are employed in fields to collect some physical data maybe 
analyze them based on some inbuilt algorithms and forward same to a central unit for further use [3]. Attacks 
based on generation of random signals without following the underlying MAC rules have shown to interfere 
with normal operation of most wireless networks. These interferences have shown to be more common in 
wireless networks than their wired counterparts [4]. The nodes in WSNs are known to have low communication 
bandwidth, short communication range, limited energy storage capacity and generally poor hardware and system 
resources like, memory, storage and computational power [5]. This implies that most security attack mitigation 
methods available for tradition networks implemented on the conventional computer systems would either be 
too large to be used on these grades of system or would not function as intended when applied to these nodes 
due to their limitations. 
1.1 Security Issues in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) 
The main purpose of wireless sensor networks is to transmit data in a secure and fast manner from a node to a 
sink node that in turn sends same to a base station through multi-hop transmission [6]. The sink node is 
responsible for receiving data from the various sensors associated with it in a particular network and forwards 
same to the base station. Due to their peculiar importance in wireless sensor networks, they are usually located 
at strategic point in the network to reduce energy requirement of the overall network.   
 
Figure 1: Hierarchical Diagram of Security Issues in Wireless Sensor Network 
American Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences (ASRJETS) (2020) Volume 67, No  1, pp 48-65 
50 
 
Most sensor networks being data-centric requires that the privacy, integrity, confidentiality of data must be 
ensured owing to the fact that most of the data carried by these sensors if compromised could lead to 
industrial/national espionage or even threat to life [7]. Security of communication between nodes and between 
nodes and sink nodes must be guaranteed in a WSN for improved efficiency and trust. A number of attacks exist 
in a wireless sensor network which can lead to breach in communication, sensor node routing or even 
information leakage. These attacks are shown in figure 1 
From figure 1, attacks that can be carried out on a wireless sensor network can be grouped into three areas [8]: 
i. Secrecy and authentication attacks 
ii. Service integrity silence attacks 
iii. Network availability attacks: DDoS which prevents legitimate users access to authorized network 
resources falls under this category. 
Different attacks on the different layers of the WSN shown in figure 1 are described below for better 
understanding of the nature of attacks that WSN are susceptible to. 
a. DoS attack on the physical layer: In the WSNs, this layer is responsible for carrier frequency selection and 
generation, modulation and demodulation, encryption and decryption, transmission and reception of data 
[9]. 
This layer is attacked mainly by the following schemes 
i. Jamming: This type of attack compromises the communication channels between two nodes thereby 
preventing them from exchanging information. 
ii. Node tampering: This is the process of physically tampering with the nodes of the WSN with the sole 
aim of extracting sensitive information. 
b. DoS attack on the link layer: Multiplexing of various data streams, detection of data frames, media access 
control (MAC) and error control are all the functions of the link layer. The reliability of point – to - point or 
point – to – multipoint communication is also guaranteed by this layer [10]. The following DoS attack occur 
in this layer; 
i. Collision: This may occur when two nodes in a network sense the channel to be idle at the same time 
and starts transmission of data packets on the same frequency channel. Collision of packets may results 
in packet modification or even loss which may lead to identification mismatch at the receiving node. 
Once this happens, a re-transmission request may is initiated by the receiving node hence, making the 
channel busy and overworked maliciously (Ghildiyal and his colleagues 2014). 
ii. Unfairness: This is a collision based attack usually refered to as exhaustion based attacks (Ghildiyal 
and his colleagues 2014). 
iii. Battery Exhaustion: Here, high traffic activities is maliciously perpetrated on the channel thereby 
making the channels accessibilty to authorized nodes limited. This is usually caused by a lot of re-
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transmission requests and request to send signals. 
c. DoS attack on the network layer: In WSN, network layer handles all routing requirements. Some DoS 
attacks that occur in this area is described below; 
i. Spoofing, traffic misdirection and replaying 
ii. Hello flood attack: Here, the channel is congested with an unusually high number of useless messages 
thereby causing high traffic in the channel. This attack employs a single malicious node in generating 
the useless message which is in turn replayed by the attacker causing high traffic in the channel. 
iii. Homing: It begins with a search in the network for cluster heads and key managers. Compromising key 
mangers and cluster heads if successful can shut down an entire network. 
iv. Selective forwarding: A compromised node here only sends information to a few selected nodes 
instead of all the nodes in the network.  The choice of nodes to forward data to is made by the attacker 
in other to achieve its malicious objectives. 
v. Sybil: Sybil attacks involved the attacker replicating a single node and presenting it with multiple 
identities to other nodes in the network. 
vi. Wormhole: This DoS attack relocates bits of data from the designated position in the network to 
another. Bits relocation is achieved through data bits tunneling over a low latency link. 
vii. Acknowledgement flooding: Routing algorithm requires acknowledgments. This attack spoofs this 
acknowledgment with the aim of providing false information to the designated node(s). 
 
Figure 2: Types of Denial of Attack in Wireless Sensor Network 
d. DoS attack on Transport Layer: Transport layer handles data transmission reliability and smoothening of 
congestions that may result from high traffic in routers. A few DoS attacks in this layer are; 
i. Flooding: Here, the attacker consciously floods the network with unnecessary messages causing high 
traffic in the channel. 
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ii. De-synchronization: This attack employs fake messages at one or both endpoints requesting or 
initiating re-transmission for correction of an error that never occurred in the network. During this 
process, one or both end-point looses energy as a result of carrying out the spoofed instruction. 
DoS attack on the Application layer: This layer to an extent handles traffic management in WSN. But the main 
purpose of this layer is to provide different software applications that would carry out the translation of data into 
a comprehensible form and also help in information aggregation by sending queries [10]. Here, a compromised 
sensor node is forced to initiate a huge traffic in the route towards the base station there by making the path 
inaccessible by legitimate nodes [11]. 
2. Jamming attacks in wireless sensor networks 
The sensors that constitute the nodes of WSNs are often deployed in inaccessible, most times dangerous and 
remote areas and are known to have limited system resources. These characteristics alongside the high 
vulnerability of wireless networks have made WSNs quite susceptible to DoS attacks especially jamming [12]. 
Recently, the Mirai malware was reported to have been used to cause large scare DoS attack infecting over 
100,000 nodes on the same day making the underlying network inaccessible to these devices. This attack was 
considered to be the largest botnet attack ever recorded with a magnitude in the range of 1.2Tbps [13]. In the 
situation of jamming activity, an adversary generates random radio frequency at the same strength with the 
legitimate nodes in the network with the intentions of disrupting transfer of data between these nodes. Although 
jamming can occur legitimately by some natural factors like noise, collision and interference [14], this 
notwithstanding, jamming attack can also be intentional in situations whereby the attacker limits or halts 
transmission of signals in the network by directing malicious signals towards the channel thereby making it 
inaccessible to legitimate nodes. Repeated sensing of the channel to determine idle time causes depletion of 
resources like battery like and bandwidth in the network. The following sections would show a model of the 
strategies employed by these jammers to achieve their sole objective in the network which are, increased energy 
consumption, low throughput and high delay in the overall network. 
3. Modeling of Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) 
Since sensor nodes are wireless and have an adhoc arrangement, there should be provision for an access method 
to be implemented by all participating device with regard to the use of the channel, how long it should be 
occupied by a device, what to do if the channel is busy and provision for error. CSMA/CA is the default access 
method for wireless networks due to its ability to avoid collision[15]. A UML Activity model diagram is 
employed for this purpose. 
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Figure 3: Activity Diagram of the CSMA employed 
The diagram of figure 3 is explained in steps thus; 
i. Prior to sending, the sending station senses the channel by evaluating the energy level at the carrier 
frequency. If the channel is busy, then the following steps are taken by the sending node; 
a. A persistent method in this case, p-persistent method is applied with back-off until the channel is idle. 
b. Once the sender finds the channel to be idle, it waits for a period of time known as distributed interframe 
space (DIFS); a control frame known as Request to Send (RTS) is subsequently sent after this wait period. 
ii. The sending station does not wait indefinitely to receive RTS from the destination station. Its sets a 
maximum amount of time it would wait for the Clear to Send (CTS) from the receiving station once 
this time elapses, it increments its back-off time and goes back to sensing the channel again and 
applying the p-persistent method. 
iii. The amount of time the sending station would occupy the channel is also contained in the RTS signal 
sent across the channel which is seen and read by every other station using the same channel. 
iv. All other station would employ this time in evaluating their Network Allocation Vector (NAV). During 
this time, they won’t sense the channel. This would go a long way in conserving energy for the 
attached nodes (stations). 
v. Once the RTS is received by the destination station, it waits a short interface space (SIFS) before 
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sending its own control signal CTS to the sending station. Sending this frame signifies that the 
destination or receiving station is set for data transmission. 
vi. The sending station would then send data after waiting for a period of time equivalent to SIFS. 
vii. The receiving station sends an acknowledgement signal to show that the frame have been received after 
it must have waited an amount of time equivalent to SIFS. 
viii. Acknowledgement is the only means the sending station confirms that data sent successfully got to the 
intended recipient. 
A UML Sequence diagram is employed to model how nodes on the channel employ NAV when applying 
CSMA/CA algorithm. Sequence diagrams are best used to describe system calls or request and show in great 
details the interaction between processes in a system. In the diagram of figure 4 for instance, the tiny rectangles 
on the lines represents a process and the length of these triangle is proportional to the duration of that particular 
process. The model is shown in figure 4; 
 
Figure 4: CSMA/CA and NAV 
The diagram above shows the interaction of four nodes (used only for reference here) employing CSMA/CA as 
access method. The sending node above first sends its control signal (RTS) to the receiving node. This control 
signal is also broadcasted to all other nodes from which they compute the NAV. Other nodes would not sense 
the channel until the NAV is exhausted. The receiving node will in turn send its own control signal (CTS) 
implying that it is ready to receive data from the sending node. To ensure that data sent was successfully 
transmitted, the receiving node sends back an acknowledgment signal to the sender denoting end of transmission 
(which is known as handshaking). 
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4. Jamming Attack Modeling 
A behavioral model of the different jamming attacks is presented in this section. The developed model is based 
on Unified Modeling Language (UML) sequence and activity diagrams. These two features of the UML 
modeling language were chosen because of their ease and simplicity in describing structural and functional 
processes of a software or digital process. The four forms of jamming attacks to be mitigated by the proposed 
framework are modeled thus [16]; 
4.1 Constant Jamming Modeling 
The constant jammers strategy is to emit radio signals with intervals between them thereby making the channel 
busy at all time hence, denying legitimate users access to the channel as they would always presume it busy at 
every trial. One major drawback of this channel is power exhaustion due to the fact that the jamming node has to 
be on always to be able to emit constant radio signals to keep the channel busy. It should be noted that a 
Jamming node do not apply the CSMA/CA algorithm as described above. This implies that it goes against all 
MAC rules. 
 
Figure 5: Activity modeling of constant jammer 
A. Activity Diagram of Constant Jamming Scenario: An Activity diagram is employed to model the 
behavior of the system. It shows the control flow from start point to finish point showing different decision 
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paths that exist while the jamming activity goes on. From the diagram above, nodes that are not under attack 
whose MAC rules like CSMA/CA have not been disabled are grouped as honest nodes. The attacker tries to 
compromise a node by making it function as a constant jammer if successful, MAC rules are disabled for that 
particular node and random data are generated and sent without prior sensing of the channel to find out if it’s 
busy or idle. Other nodes applies the default multiple access method in this CSMA/CA and sends their data into 
the same channel. Since the jammer node constantly sends signal, at some point the data from the honest node 
collides with that from the jammer node as shown in figure 5. 
B. Sequence Modeling of Constant Jamming Attack: To capture the interaction of objects involved in the 
jamming process, a sequence diagram is employed to model the constant jamming attack. 
 
Figure 6: Sequential modeling of constant jamming attack 
From the above model, Node0: after applying the default MAC rules and CSMA/CA algorithm defined in figure 
3, sends RTS to Noden: Which in turn sends a CTS to it, signifying its readiness to receive data. Once this 
control signal is received, Node0 sends its data through the channel to Noden. At this point the attacker hasn’t 
succeeded hence all nodes are still honest nodes. Once the attacker captures node1 as shown in figure 6, it 
makes it a jammer node and subsequently disables its MAC rules and access method (CSMA/CA).  Node0 at a 
later point tries to send data to Noden by sending its control signal RTS which Noden responds by sending CTS 
that collides with the random data generated by node1 as a jammer node. This same process occurs for Node2 
whom after sending RTS to Noden and obtaining CTS has its data collide with the jammer nodes random data. 
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This process continues and eventually collapses the entire network. 
4.2 Deceptive Jamming Modeling  
The major difference between the constant jammer and deceptive jammer is that the later sends randomly 
generated data without any interval between them once the node has been compromised. This strategy makes 
other nodes believe that there is a legitimate communication hence putting all other nodes in a receive state. 
A. Activity Diagram of Deceptive Jamming Scenario: A model of the behavior of the deceptive jamming 
is shown in figure 7 using UML activity diagram. It shows the flow control from start of the jamming attack to 
when the attacker takes over the whole network. 
 
Figure 7: Activity Modeling of Deceptive Jamming Attack 
From figure 7, the nodes that are not affected by jamming attack are classified as ‘Honest nodes’. The Deceptive 
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jamming is first initiated and if successful, it makes the comprised node a jammer. If unsuccessful the normal 
sensing methods like CSMA/CA is applied following the existing MAC rules. Once the node has been made a 
jammer, it then would employ the deceptive jamming strategy described above by generating random data with 
no interval between them. This makes the other nodes trying to access the channel to assume that there is a 
legitimate transmission ongoing in the channel thereby putting them in receive mode throughout the jamming 
duration. 
B. Sequence Modeling of Deceptive Jamming Attack: To capture the interaction of objects involved in the 
jamming process, a sequence diagram is employed to model the Deceptive jamming attack thus; 
 
Figure 8: Sequence Modeling of Deceptive Jamming Attack 
Figure 8 shows the sequence model of the Deceptive jamming attack, showing the duration of the attack and 
when Node1 was captured. The capturing of Node1 takes place just after successful data transfer between 
Node0 and Noden. Once Node1 is successful made to act as a deceptive jammer, it continuously sends random 
data around in the channel with no gap between them as depicted in the system call line in the model. This 
American Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences (ASRJETS) (2020) Volume 67, No  1, pp 48-65 
59 
 
random data collides with the clear to send (CTS) control signal coming from Noden to Node0 after it 
successfully receives the RTS from Node0. This collision is sensed by Node0 at a later point which keeps this 
Node in receive state. Also, the same applies to Node2 which after sending RTS to Noden, receiving CTS from 
Noden and resuming data transfer has its data colliding with the random data from the jammer node. This 
collision is sensed by Node2 at a later point making it to assume that there is legitimate activity going on in the 
channel thereby keeping it in receive state.  
4.3 Random Jamming Modeling 
 
Figure 9: Activity model of Random Jamming strategy 
Random jamming is a bit more tactical than the already described jamming strategies. It employs ways of 
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conserving its energy. After attack for a while it goes into sleep mode, it could then behave either as a constant 
or deceptive jammer. This jamming strategy is modeled below. 
A. Activity Diagram of Random Jamming Scenario: A model of the behavior of the random jamming is 
shown in figure 9 using UML activity diagram. It shows the flow control from start of the jamming attack to 
when the jamming node goes to sleep and resumes either as a constant or deceptive jammer. 
 
Figure 10: Sequence Modeling of Random Jamming Technique 
From figure 9, the nodes that the attacker is not able to compromise are classified as ‘Honest Nodes’.  Once the 
attacker is successful, it converts one of the nodes in the network as a jammer node, making it behave like a 
random jammer. From figure 9, we can see that if the attack is unsuccessful, the ‘honest nodes’ applies the 
normal sensing methods and MAC rules guiding channel access. But if the attack is successful, it makes the 
node a random jammer and can employ either of the jamming strategies of the constant or deceptive jammer 
described above. After jamming for a while, it goes to sleep and resumes at a predetermined time to carry out 
the jamming over again. During Jamming, the ‘honest nodes’ tries applying the guiding sensing methods and 
MAC rules only to discover that the channel is busy (high energy level) this causes it to back-off and remain in 
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sleep mode. It should be noted that random jammer last longer since it allows the jammer to sleep for a while 
after jamming for a specified or random period (according to the design of the attack) thereby conserving its 
energy. 
B. Sequence Modeling of Random Jamming Attack: To capture the interaction of objects involved in the 
jamming process, a sequence diagram is employed to model the Random jamming attack thus; 
From figure 10, Node1 is captured and converted to a Random jammer after successful data transmission from 
Node0 to Noden. Once the node is captured, it is made to act in this first instance as a deceptive jammer, 
generating random data without interval between them. This is depicted by the long system call line in the 
model. This jamming strategy goes on for a while and affects the CTS signal coming from Noden to Node0. The 
jamming instance at this time also affects the data going from Node2 to Noden after Node2 must have received 
CTS signal from Noden. The data sent by Node2 to Noden collides with that random data generated by the 
jamming node. After this first instance, the jamming node goes to sleep to resume at a later time. The model 
shows that on resumption, the jamming node employs constant jamming strategy this is clearly shown by the 
short system call line. During this instance, the jamming node (Node1) sends Random data through the channel 
which affects the data being sent from Node0 to Noden. This occurrence put the nodes associated with this 
network in receive state, making the attacker to take full control of the channel. It can be seen from the model 
that after this jamming instance, the jamming node goes to sleep mode to resume at a later time either as a 
constant jammer of random jammer according to the design of the attack.  
4.4 Reactive Jamming Modeling 
Reactive jamming is the most complex of all the jamming strategies and it’s the only active jamming strategy 
(the other three are classified under passive jamming strategy). The reactive jammer remains in a quiet or idle 
state until it senses an activity in the channel by checking the energy level in the channel. Once it notices 
activities in the channel, it begins transmission of random data causing occurrence of jamming. By behaving this 
way, reactive jammers last longer since the idle or sleep mode enables it to conserve energy. 
A. Activity Diagram of Reactive Jamming Scenario: A model of the behavior of the reactive jammer is 
shown in figure 11 using UML activity diagram. It shows the flow control from when the jamming node senses 
activity in the channel, resumes jamming to when it goes to sleep after a successful jamming operation to 
resume when next it senses activities in the channel. 
From figure 11, once the attacker succeeds in converting a node in the network as a reactive jammer, unlike the 
other jamming strategies, it does not commence random signal generation immediately. The reactive jammer 
first senses the channel to detect if there is an activity in the channel. If there no activity, it goes back to sleep 
but if there is an activity it generates and sends random signal across the channel. This random data could then 
collide with the RTS signal, CTS signal or even data being sent by an honest node. Several of these occurrences 
may bring the whole network to a halt. 
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Figure 11: Activity Modeling of Reactive Jamming Attack 
B. Sequence Modeling of Reactive Jamming Attack: To capture the interaction of objects involved in the 
jamming process, a sequence diagram is employed to model the reactive jamming attack thus; 
From figure 12, the attacker only succeeds in converting Node1 into a jamming node after there has been a 
successful transmission of data between Node0 and Noden. Once Node1 is made a jammer, it does not 
commence jamming operation immediately. It first senses the channel for activities and in this case observes the 
RTS sent by Node0 to Noden at this instance, it commences the jamming operation by generating and sending 
random data. This random data collides with the CTS control signal sent by Noden to Node1.  This collision 
sends Node0 to receive mode, since there is no more activity in the channel, Node1 goes back to sleep mode. 
Another instance of jamming is when Node2 sends RTS to Noden and subsequently receives CTS from Noden 
again; Node1 senses activities in the channel and resumes its jamming operation by generating and sending 
jamming signals that eventually collides with the data being sent by Node2 to Noden. This collision also put 
Node2 to receive state halting the network. 
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Figure 12: Sequence Modeling of Reactive Jamming Attack 
5. Conclusion 
Jamming attack is a prevalent security issue in wireless networks especially those involving sensor nodes that 
are known to have low system resources. It is even harder to manage and track since most of these sensors are 
located in areas that may be inaccessible to human or even hazardous like nuclear reactors. Based on this, 
algorithms to allow these nodes in WSNs self heal themselves and mitigate these attack when they occur is a 
major requirement prior to their deployment in fields. In this work, a model of the strategies employed by the 
four major jamming attack instance like constant, random, deceptive and reactive jammer was provided. The 
model also shows that the reactive jammer is the most intelligent kind of jammer due it its active nature and may 
be the most difficult to detect as the energy level in the network is not reasonably affected since the jammer only 
resumes activities when there is data movement in the channel. In terms of battery conservation, the reactive 
jammer also showed good features implying that its jamming activities would be sustained more than the other 
three. The deceptive jammer would definitely have the quickest battery exhaustion as a result of the strategy it 
employs. The models above would go a long way in helping researchers in developing algorithms for Denial of 
Service attack mitigation in wireless sensor networks 
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6. Recommendation  
For future work, it is recommended that the models be integrated into frameworks for jamming attack mitigation 
in Wireless sensor networks associated with IoT nodes. They should also be employed as a critical component 
of intrusion detection systems design in wireless sensor network based on the behavioral models provided. This 
holds true since the above models have shown clearly how these attacks operate and how they affect the 
respective nodes and networks. 
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